THE New Republic

The New Cars: How Strato Is Your Streak?

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DECEMBER 13, 1954

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T. R. B.

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Washington Wire

Vice President Nixon hit the desk with his ivory gavel and said the most electrifying words in the English language. "The clerk will call the roll." "Mrs. Abel," said the clerk. . . .

The bells began ringing. They are softer than fire bells, milder than church bells, less terrible than doorbells rung at night in totalitarian countries, but they are the most compelling bells on earth. Once sounded nothing can stop a Senate vote, and they symbolize majority rule and all the things in democracy which McCarthyism leaves out.

". . . Aye," said Mrs. Abel (R, Neb.). "Mr. Aiken," continued the clerk. "Nay," said a Vermont voice.

It was the first test vote—the Dirksen substitute resolution—a last, desperate attempt to whitewash McCarthy. Down below in the great railway station of a chamber the bald heads and foreshortened bodies seemed to swim among the desks, splashed with their white papers. Reporters' eyes smarted with the long vigil. Yet the atmosphere was somehow cozy and intimate, even with several thousand spectators crouching over the rails. A kind of hypnotic fog filled the air—not a palpable vapor but the ghostly exhalation of millions of words uttered here by generations of politicians.

Hearts pounding, reporters marked long sheets of 96 names, Republicans inked large, Democrats small, "Yeas" on left, "Nays" on right. As the tally proceeded the experts added a cumulative number on either side; he could tell at each second how the record stood.

"Mr. Anderson," said the clerk. "Mr. Barrett. . . ."

The suspense equalled the start of the first ballot at a Presidential nominating convention. All week the Senators had played their favorite roles—being themselves, Brahmin Saltonstall, saccharine Dirksen, vibrant Mrs. Smith (R, Me.)—whose conscience spoke first in 1950. Now they answered their names, Republicans wildly floundering, Democrats united after giving McCarthy the silent treatment—the treatment he will get hereafter. The press knew them well, the men down below.

There was fragile Watkins (R, Utah), revealing the terrible wrath of a Puritan once roused; Case (R, S.Dak.), a member of the committee—the little man who almost broke under pressure; Flanders, the Yankee mystic, who consulted his God and came up with the censure resolution. There was Langer, last heir of prairie Populists, erratic as an unroped steer, chewing a cigar through cellophane and voting against censure; aged Hayden (D, Ariz.), beaked and bald as an amiable buzzard, who saw Bingham censured 25 years before; judicial Ervin (D, N.C.), the new Democratic hero, whose tic sends his eyebrows up and down like awnings; Alexander Smith (R), that strange old man from the State of New Jersey who meets every call of principle by trying to compromise it.

Then the party leaders: A sigh rises as barrel-chested Knowland votes for McCarthy and repudiates the men whom he put on the Watkins committee. Supple, gum-chewing Lyndon Johnson has miraculously brought the Democrats through united; every man below knows that when Knowland defected Johnson jumped to his feet to uphold the Watkins committee.

There are the McCarthyites: Hickenlooper who prowls as he talks and can't deliver a speech without 10 feet of carpet. There is McCarthy himself, lumpish and slump-shouldered, looking more Napoleonic than ever with his arm slung to chest by a theatrically big bandage, and coat thrown over shoulders like a Marechal's cape. And there are the Men of Hate, Jenner and Welker—the passionate men. All over the world there are men like these; there is one in every mob—who gives the scream or fires the pistol that precipitates the holocaust.

Jenner is the jerky one, he has been angry from the nipple on—Eisenhower insured his election in the same 1952 campaign in which he backed McCarthy. Reporters could hear his yells in this debate back in the press room behind the swinging glass doors. McCarthy, Welker and Jenner have this in common, contempt for the anachronistic Senate and the silly old duffers who sit in it and who like to tell each other comfortingly that it is "the greatest deliberative body in the world." McCarthy never showed his contempt more than in the very form of his so-called "apology."

Of all the great drama that and the sequel—Dirksen's speech—were the two strangest scenes: Dirksen, the curly-haired, syrup-voiced Liberace of the Senate, urging nauseated members to remember the season and show forebearance in the month (he said) when men sang *Oh Little Town of Bethlehem* and *Hark, the Herald Angels Sing*.

Reporters dash for telephones. The vote is overwhelming — the Dirksen whitewash substitute defeated, 66 to 21. Next day the Senate votes condemnation, 67 to 22. In the final vote six of the eight Catholic Senators present vote against McCarthy—an important point in the background story (that everyone whispers and nobody writes) of the rise of the new bigotry fanned by McCarthy.

The Senate has dropped the Zwicker count. This means that the smug old body condemns browbeating Senators but not private citizens; that it still hates the Executive and anybody connected with it, even officers. Well, that's like the Senate. All those specific questions of Joe's finances are dropped, too—did he play the market with money contributed to fight Communism? But there it is, McCarthy has run true to form—censured by fellow lawyers as a Wisconsin lawyer, by fellow judges as a Wisconsin judge, now by fellow Senators as a United States Senator.

From now on Joe is the man with the Scarlet Letter. He has "C" written on his coat, put there by men who know him best. . . . Well, well; a good week! McCarthy censured by the Senate—and in the White House, on foreign affairs, Dwight Eisenhower acting like the President of the United States!

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Bite-Size Power

THE Hell's Canyon fight is 18 months old—almost as old as the Republican Administration. One of the first in a series of "give-aways" and "break-ups" which have been this Administration's domestic trademark over the past two years, Hell's Canyon, even more than "Dixon-Yates," seems to symbolize the degree to which Republicans are ready to sacrifice the public welfare to a slogan which makes them ready dupes for any fast talking *entrepreneur* whether he sells oil, power or battery additives: "private enterprise is best!"

The story by now is familiar. The Columbia Basin is a network of rivers which, once controlled, could supply the entire Pacific Northwest with power, irrigation and transportation instead of periodically ravaging it with floods. But to harness the network's full potential, each part must be developed with an eye to the whole. Hell's Canyon is a spot high up on one chain of rivers in the network where a high dam could be built not only to produce electricity but also to hold back enough water to insure a constant, even flow down through the chain below it. The government had long planned such a dam for Hell's Canyon and resisted the efforts of the Idaho Power Company to build instead first one, then five, then three small dams, useless except for the production of power, when the Secretary of the Interior, Douglas McKay ended its opposition in May, 1953, leaving the decision with the Federal Power Commission—three Republicans, one Eisenhower Democrat, one independent.

Now the FPC staff has filed a report which, to quote *Business Week,* "buys most of the power company's contentions." So it looks like the Idaho Power Company will get a 50-year license to develop one of the country's few remaining great dam-sites in such a way as to lower the potential of the entire Columbia Basin.

The FPC staff seems to have acted on the basis of an analysis by Lesher Wing, its San Francisco regional engineer, who claimed that it didn't much matter about high or low dams because in 10 years much of the power in the area will come from steam plants. It is difficult to know how Wing developed that prophecy, but then the FPC San Francisco office has a rather remarkable record of being wrong in estimating Northwest hydroelectric needs and development.

It seems clear that the FPC as it is now constituted reflects Republican determination to establish at any cost as many roadblocks to "creeping socialism" as possible during the coming two years. With Hell's Canyon, the process of fragmenting the development of the Columbia Basin into un-coordinated projects will have begun.

Where "Dixon-Yates" attacks a firmly established, operating system that can appeal for support on the basis of accomplishment, Hell's Canyon is step one in the break-up of a system in the process of being born, a promise which two years of concentrated effort could kill.

Democratic Harmony

THE MEETING in New Orleans of Democratic Party stalwarts to pick a successor to National Committee Chairman Stephen Mitchell produced no explosions because so many cared so little who got the job. With no patronage to dispense, and a great deficit to make up, the National Committee has not been very popular among Democratic leaders during the past two years. And these men feel that the power to choose a candidate in 1956 will reside in their state organizations anyway. So although the contest was open and spirited, there are no lasting scars or grudges, and the new Chairman, Paul Butler, is free to determine how big or small his job will be. In politics all his life—Young Democrats, ward leader, district leader, National Committeeman — Butler is known as a "reform" man in his home state, Indiana, but hasn't been able to win any impressive elections there.

Two important decisions were taken in New Orleans. The Committee on Rules, which included men usually as far apart as Sen. Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and former Gov. John Battle of Virginia, agreed that the "Loyalty Oath" which raised havoc at the 1952 convention was a meaningless thing in itself and would not be an issue in 1956. And agreement was reached, after disagreement throughout the recent campaign, that President Eisenhower was from now on to be a principal target for political attack—a decision promptly reflected in speeches by Adlai Stevenson, Averell Harriman and the new Chairman, Butler.

The meeting demonstrated unity. But although Butler was frankly presented as Stevenson's candidate, and the anti-Stevenson forces showed up poorly in the voting, the results do not guarantee Stevenson an easy win in 1956. Much

Come on—let's take the short cut

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of the opposition to Butler came from the big cities in the big states. Delegates from New York and Pennsylvania, for example, together could cast only four votes at New Orleans; at the 1956 nominating convention, they will have 94 and 70 respectively.

Two Prime Ministers

ON NOVEMBER 30 Parliament opened a new session with the familiar blaze of pageantry as the Queen read the government's legislative program from her throne in the House of Lords. This time the program was so barren of anything but platitudes that most observers agreed a General Election was planned for the coming year. The decision still rests with the incalculable Winston Churchill, who, 80 years young that day, shows less sign of retiring than ever.

Indeed, Churchill's unweakening relish for the party battle makes even more remarkable the unanimous all-party tribute which was paid him on his birthday. Attlee as Leader of the Opposition made the presentation of a portrait to whose cost nearly all Members of Parliament had subscribed, while Dai Grenfell, the old Welsh miner who ranks as Father of the House, handed Churchill a memorial volume signed by every member. There is no precedent in the history of democracy for such a unanimous demonstration of affection and respect to the leader of a political party still energetic in the electoral fight. It is evidence, not only of the unparalleled qualities of Churchill as a man, but also of the maturity of British parliamentary democracy.

The same day as Britain was providing this proof of national unity and democratic stability, events in another country of the Commonwealth were pointing in a very different direction. In South Africa the dominant Nationalist Party was electing as leader and Prime Minister a man whose rigid fanaticism may soon split his own country and the Commonwealth itself.

Ever since the Nationalist Party won the South African election on a policy of *apartheid*, its attempt to impose absolute racial segregation in all fields of South African life has been straining the unity of both South Africa and the Commonwealth. Unfortunately the main opposition, the United Party, has never plucked up the courage to adopt a liberal alternative to *apartheid*.

A month ago the aged leader of the Nationalists, Dr. Malan, suddenly announced his intention of retiring, and there seemed a chance of organizing some co-operation between the moderate Nationalists and the United Party, providing Malan's successor was not opposed. But the United Party fumbled its opportunity, and on November 30th the Nationalist caucus chose the extremist leader, Strydom, as Prime Minister.

Strydom is a bitter, unyielding doctrinaire whose views on most subjects would in Europe be regarded as Fascist. He is determined to force *apartheid* through at an ever faster pace, and to crush all constitutional obstacles in doing so. He is a prominent supporter of Afrikaner domination over the English-speaking South Africans. He wants South Africa to be a Republic, outside the Commonwealth. And he will renew South Africa's demand for control of the protectorates now under British administration—islands of racial tolerance in the sea of segregation.

If Strydom now attempts to carry out his policies, he may produce civil war in South Africa—a country of great strategic importance to the whole free world, and of considerable economic importance to Britain. Conceivably, the country might be partitioned between Afrikaans and the English-speaking population. In any case, his external policy may rupture the Commonwealth, unless South Africa secedes first.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

While You Weren't Looking

"Masterful Job"

THE 35,000 new public housing units authorized by the Housing Act of 1954 in all likelihood will never be built. Restrictions written into the act by Congress probably will make it impossible for any large city to qualify for any of the low-rent homes promised by President Eisenhower and ostensibly approved by Congress.

The trouble stems from two provisions in the 1954 Act, one a technicality, the other a deadline.

To qualify for any of the 35,000 homes a city must show they are needed to house families whose homes have been demolished by slum clearance, blight removal or other governmental action. On this basis, Chicago, for example, can demonstrate that it will need homes for 3,800 low-income families next year and for each of the four years afterward.

But another section of the act stipulates that preference in public housing must go to these displaced families. There are in Chicago's 12,500 public-housing apartments and houses which produce some 1,200 to 1,300 "turnover" vacancies each year. Add these to the 5,000 new units which will be completed next year under 1949 contracts, and there will be in Chicago approximately 7,500 public-housing units available in 1955. If housing authorities must under the law disregard the needs of the 20,000 or so families which are

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Michael Straight, *Editor*
Gilbert A. Harrison, *Publisher*
Helen Fuller, *Managing Editor*
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Tom Fitzsimmons, *Staff Writer*
F. R. Ruskin, *Administrative Assistant*
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Lucille Davis, *Copy Assistant*

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now waiting for public housing and of those whose homes may be destroyed by fire or other "non-governmental" action, all of the 3,800 who will lose their homes through "governmental" operations can be easily accommodated. Chicago could not establish a "need" for additional housing under the 1954 Act.

Housing officials admit that every other large city with public housing is in exactly the same fix; even Albert M. Cole, Housing and Home Finance Administrator, seems genuinely distressed and is seeking a way out.

But funds provided for the 35,000 units expire on June 30, 1955. It is now December. Even if a way were discovered in which cities could establish their "need" for some of the 35,000 units, HHFA would have to certify this fact formally, then the cities would have to obtain city council approval of all proposed sites, then submit preliminary architectural plans and cost estimates to federal authorities. HHFA would then have to negotiate a contract with the city.

Past negotiations of such contracts—after all required data is in—has required six months. Cole hopes to reduce it to four. Even if he does, completed city applications would have to be in HHFA hands by March 1 at the latest—practically an impossibility.

If public-housing bogs down now, Cole says he will ask Congress to amend the act. He would get strong support from Sen. Paul Douglas (D, Ill.), who has announced that he will introduce a bill early next session to clear away these restrictions and to re-authorize the 560,000 units originally planned under the Act of 1949. Rep. Sidney R. Yates (D, Ill.) plans even faster action. A member of the Appropriations Committee, he intends by means of a rider to the appropriations bill to knock out the hampering restrictions.

Last session Douglas predicted on the floor of the Senate (as the *NR* did in these pages) that exactly these difficulties would result from the 1954 Act. The anti-housing forces knew it too: Yates recalls the day Rep. Jesse P. Wolcott (R, Mich.) a bitter foe of public housing, presented the conference report on the housing bill to the House of Representatives. "I'll never forget it," says Yates. "He said, 'We've done a masterful job on public housing,' and no one in the House missed his double meaning."

A Word to the Wise

Now that the Ten Million Americans Mobilized For Justice — the league of pro-McCarthy petitioners which turned out to be slightly smaller than that—has announced it will remain on the political scene as a permanent organization, one never knows when he'll be called upon to deliver a short but rousing speech at a pro-McCarthy rally. So here's a handy list of sure-fire talking points:

1. America began around 1776 when the Founding Fathers, God-fearing patriots all, defeated the British (Redcoats lends itself to punning) and gave the legislative branch of the new government the power to investigate the executive branch. Things went along pretty well until 1933 when the Administration (pause for shouts of Roosevelt! Roosevelt!), steered by still unexposed sinister forces, recognized the bloody atheistic Bolsheviks. From that wicked moment the country has steadily gone downhill: Martin Dies, pioneering patriot, was excoriated and martyred; information that the Japs were bent on attacking Pearl Harbor was never relayed to General MacArthur; the sinister forces in high places accepted the atheistic Reds as buddies and delivered one-quarter of mankind into concentration camps; Generals MacArthur, Van Fleet and Clark were prevented from fighting the Korean War in an American way—to the end. Things have reached the point where eggheads can fill their papers with talk of co-existence.

2. Joe McCarthy is not important in himself—although certainly the greatest patriot of the century. Joe's a symbol. He stands alone today, vilified and lampooned (shades of Martin Dies) because he had the courage to spotlight those sinister forces which have been selling America to the Commies piecemeal for 20 years.

A tool of Divine Providence, and in constant communion with the Founding Fathers, Joe is singlehandedly battling Reds and the just plain stupid. (Who promoted Peress?)

3. A small clique of rich Communist-Fronters — sometimes called (sneer) liberals — with (pause) headquarters in New York, maneuvered a censure motion through Congress over the protests of little "peepul" throughout the country. These real Americans see in Joe the personification of Americanism. "A fighting Irish Marine," as the great George Sokolsky has described him, he embodies the real American qualities: warlike and devout; tough but not above weeping for the boys in Korea. All real Americans love Joe—despite the malicious, slanted reporting of left-wing papers like the *N.Y. Times*.

4. To censure this man is to play into the hands of Godless Communism, undermine the Constitution, curb freedom of speech, and betray George Washington up to his knees in snow at Valley Forge. The threat to the Constitution today is nurtured by Executive blackout orders. Instead of wasting time with cry-baby generals and senile Senators, instead of doing the bidding of the leftist clique (pause) in New York, the Senate should be investigating the Executive department, rooting out all those who do not see that co-existence with evil incarnate is an affront to the Lord. The Executive is led by a weakling and infiltrated by pseudo-intellectual appeasers, products of irreverent progressive education.

5. In the name of America and of Christianity, we should be blockading China this very minute. God bless McCarthy.

Other permanent groups which look to McCarthy as a rallying point include the National Patrick Henry Organization, the Constitutional Educational League, the Defenders of the Christian Faith, the Williams Intelligence Service, the National Economic Council, the Congress of Freedom, the American Nationalist and the Christian Nationalist Crusade.

This last is led by Gerald L. K. Smith who added his own inimitable touch to the censure debate by circulating the following message among the Senators: "A Word to the Wise: We are keeping careful tabs on all Senators. . . . In case of war or intensification of Cold War, any Senator who made it difficult for McCarthy will be automatically retired as an appeaser of Communism."

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Rome Dispatch THE HOPES OF POPE PIUS

Pope Pius XII, if his health permits, is expected to announce that he will hold a Consistory early next year. If it takes place, it will be the third of his pontificate. And for a number of reasons, connected with the role of Pius as one of the most vigorous proponents of the political as well as moral influence of the Roman Catholic Church since the great Hildebrand, Saint Gregory VII, nearly 900 years ago, it is likely also to be by far the most important.

The ostensible purpose of the Consistory is to fill six vacancies in the Sacred College of Cardinals in order to bring that body of Princes of the Church to its *plenum* of 70 members. The decision that the full membership should not exceed that number was taken by Pope Sixtus V in the year 1586. At that time there were about 100 million communicants of the Church in the world. Now there are nearly 425 million. At the end of the sixteenth century the so-called demographic center was in Western Europe. Now in the middle of the twentieth century the Church, as always universal, is also intercontinental and international in the broadest sense.

There have been other changes. The struggle to maintain the Church's authority, which brought the German Emperor Henry IV to his knees at Canossa, took place in a small framework compared to the struggle which Pius XII has waged throughout his reign against the masters of Communism. The task of the present Pope has no historical precedent in size and significance since the Counter-Reformation.



The coming Consistory is important if only because it is preceded by renewed and stronger rumors that it will take into account some of the changes since the sixteenth century—that it will be used as the occasion to increase the *plenum* of the Sacred College to 80 or even 100 members. During his last Consistorial allocution, nearly ten years ago, Pius paid some attention to such rumors. He said: "Under the present circumstances, after having diligently considered the situation, it does not seem opportune to change the number of Cardinals." Since then, however, the circumstances and the situation—within the Church, in the world, and in the relation between the Church and the world of politics—have changed.

For one thing, the Pope's health is giving cause for more serious disquietude than at any previous time. He returned this year to Vatican City from his summer residence at Castelgandolfo in a state of extreme fatigue. Some of the symptoms of his last previous illness have reappeared. Last time he recovered by what was called a miracle. He may do so again. But many persons who have seen him recently are seriously concerned; they doubt that he could survive another attack anywhere near as severe as the present one.

The Pope's first two Consistories provided revolutionary innovations. At the first, in February, 1946, 32 Cardinals were named—a record number. At the second, in January, 1953, the Red Hat was given to 24 prelates. Even more important, Pius in 1946 put the Italian Cardinals in a minority in the Sacred College for the first time in history; there were 28 Italians against 42 foreigners. The spread was accentuated in 1953; there were 26 Italians and 44 foreigners. At present there are only six vacancies, and it might be considered unusual that the Pope should hold a Consistory to fill so few posts.

But five of the six Cardinals who have died were Italians. And the average age of the surviving Italian members of the College is much higher than that of the foreigners. Six are more than 80 years old, while of the Cardinals under 70 years of age only five are Italians compared with 25 foreigners. In order for a Cardinal to be elected Pope at a Conclave held for the purpose, he must get the votes of two-thirds of the membership of the College plus one more vote. The point of the present situation is that, if Pius died and a conclave were held for the choosing of his successor before the third Consistory, the Italians in the College would not have the one-third of the membership needed to exercise veto power. There is practically no question that a non-Italian would be chosen as Pope.

But there seems to be a question whether the "internationalized" College of Cardinals, as created by the Pope in the first two Consistories, would—without the influence of the Italian veto power—carry out the ideas and policies which have developed at the Vatican during the last year or so. It has been during this period that the Pope has become increasingly concerned about what he has called ABC war—atomic, biological, chemical. His was one of the first voices to be raised in fervent warning against the use of the threat of such conflict as an instrument of political or psychological warfare.

The tragically inevitable corollary of this view is that the true friends of peace must accept a long period of difficult co-existence with the enemies of the West's religious faiths and political and human ways of life. A number of statements made by the Pope last spring (and reported in this column) indicated the change. Since then it has steadily become more marked. The universal point of view has gradually taken precedence over the international—in the simple, political sense. And the Pope, one of the greatest political figures ever produced by the Church of Rome, has shifted the center of his preoccupations from the political plane to the spiritual and moral one.

And why the concern with a veto power by an Italian third in the Sacred College of Cardinals? The reason is that Pope Pius is an Italian, a Roman. But that isn't all; he is a product of the deep, warm, humane humanism of the Mediterranean culture. And at a time of great crisis in the affairs of mankind, he instinctively turns to other Italians in the expectation—or the hope—that they too will interpret the needs of the immediate future as he does.

The timing of the third Consistory can therefore be interpreted as meaning a further, perhaps even an ultimate step, in the Pope's own "agonizing reappraisal" of the circumstances of the Church and the situation of the world in the area of the possibility of ABC war.

Rome FRANK GORRELL

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EDITORIAL

How Strato Is Your Streak?

THE AUTOMOBILE industry as all the world knows is the highest achievement of American capitalism. Automobile advertising, moreover, fattens our free press. But not these pages! The nastiness that follows, therefore, can be taken by the militant as evidence of the editorial integrity of those who cannot be bought, and by the cynical as sour grapes.

In our opinion the absurdity of the 1955 models is exceeded only by the idiocy of the advertising through which they are being foisted on the American public. It's the most unheard of thing we ever heard of, as Joe said.

Among the corporations that don't enrich us with their claims is Chevrolet. Its "motoramic" creation introduces "a new *concept* of low-cost motoring," (low cost being what a Cadillac sold for not so long ago). Motorama apparently has to do with the windshield. Chevrolet alone has an "absolutely new sweep-sight" windshield. But don't worry; you can get the *concept* from other models as well. Ford has an "entirely new huge, wrap-around windshield." Dodge has a "wholly new horizon windshield" that "*wraps* around both top and bottom" while Chrysler has a "completely new super-scenic swept-back windshield."

Most of the new models in fact seem to have moved their windshields around an inch or two. But that's not all. Chevrolet has a new *concept* but Ford's is even newer because "the totally new '55 Ford is inspired by the Thunderbird." Also Ford has "exclusive split-second trigger-torque power and Angle-Poised Ride." Plymouth, however, is newer still. It's the "great new car for the *young in heart*," the only one with "metal-in-motion styling." It also gives you "Synchro-silent" transmission and "exclusive Oriflow" shock absorbers.

But wait—Mercury isn't just completely new. It's the "entirely new out-of-the-future car that looks and goes like 1960." Its newness is in its lines, "bigger, longer, lower." Ford is also "new, larger and lower," Dodge is "lower, wider, bigger all'round and far, FAR longer," while Plymouth is "longest and lowest."

This, moreover, is *Pontiac's year to star.* Also, *Dodge has done it* and *Buick has done it again.* Pontiac has a "proud strong thrust" to its "bold front end." The "flair-fashioned" Dodge in contrast has a "bold forward thrust" and so has "won America's heart." Mercury has a *super torque* engine if what you want is torque. Buick has a "variable pitch propeller," the thing that would take you off quicker if you were in a plane. But you "can see over the new De Soto," though why you would want to, no salesman has yet paused to explain.

If you're worth more than $100 million, you won't care for the Chrysler "with the new *$100 million look.*" However, with $35 million you will be thrilled by its new tapered rear deck, its *power flite range selector* and its *new gun sight tail lights* that say *Stop*! with great authority, greater that is than Dodge's "dramatic twin jet" tail lights and Cadillac's, merely twin forked. However, you can drive in comfort for hours in a Cadillac looking for places to park its 19-foot hulk; that is unless you are one of the mad young things for whom life is empty without Pontiac's *sensational, dynamic all-new strato-streak* performance.

THE IDEA that the advertising executives want to convey, if we understand them, is that the new cars are new. What else can they say? They can't talk about price because that would ruin the racket of retailers who run prices up on new cars in order to make a show of outbidding each other on trade-ins; nor can they talk sense about cars. They don't make sense any more. There's plenty of sky in this country, but no parking space; so the industry flattens its products down and stretches them out. There are very few places you can drive at more than 55 without breaking the law or endangering life and 75 horsepower is plenty to carry six people at 55. So the industry is racing to stuff 300 horsepower in cars by way of encouraging you to break the laws and kill yourself and your victims at speeds of 110. The age of the passengers is slowly rising. So the industry spends a billion dollars in rushing to produce models made for contortionists equipped with shoehorns. There was a time when human comfort used to matter—not now! The new models concentrate lots of space—under the hood and in the trunk. Why bother about the passengers so long as the baggage that we carry once in a blue moon has loads of space to stretch out and relax.

Speaking of trunks, the only thing more ugly and ungainly than Pontiac's bold front end, in our opinion, is Cadillac's enormous rear end. The same goes for Oldsmobile and Buick and now for the rest that play follow the leader. If you failed to observe that the rear mudguards of the G.M. models look like bloomers bagging down to the knees, the point is shoved through your eyeballs by the two-tone emphasis. As for two tones we supposed that Nash's yellow and brown was the ultimate in bad taste until Pontiac turned up with tomato and pink.

We could go on forever, but then, unlike the Madison Avenue experts in basic English we might stumble on a new word for new. By the way, if you hear of a good Model A Ford with good tires and a heater, let us know. We're looking for a trade for a Model T.

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Latin American Aspirations

by Jose Figueres

PRESIDENT of one of the few democratic countries in Latin America, Jose Figueres is that rare figure, the successful revolutionary who did not seize power. In 1948, Jose Figueres led a revolt to unseat a President defeated for re-election but who refused to relinquish his office, then, when he had won, turned over the government to the man the people had chosen. Four years later, in 1953, Jose Figueres was elected President of Costa Rica by an overwhelming majority although the right-wing party joined with the outlawed Communist Party to defeat him.

I HAVE BEEN asked to state shortly for the readers of the *New Republic*, my views on the aspirations of the Latin American peoples.

First comes freedom. Respect for human rights and government by consent, as prescribed in our political constitutions and in the Charter of International Organizations, constitute the fundamental desire of our peoples.

Other needs are economic development, social justice, education opportunities and health services for all.

In the economic field our first necessity is the stabilization of prices for our exports. We cannot continue to gamble with our national income. All men and all nations have the right to know how much they are earning when they apply their toil to their natural resources, and in so doing supply a part of the needs of mankind.

Every effort should be made to divert the largest possible proportion of our income to the formation of local capital. A society does not grow on what it produces but on what it saves.

That part of the income which is destined to consumption should be distributed with a view to social justice. All those who contribute to the process of production are entitled to the highest standards made possible by the magnitude of the total product.

Such remuneration need not come exclusively through wages, but in the form of public education, health, social security and other general services.

Social justice should also be established among nations. The recent Inter-American Economic Conference held at Rio de Janeiro was a step forward in the search for equitable and enlightened commercial relations between the United States and Latin America.

The harmonious development of the Western hemisphere would bring mankind closer to the ideal of a family of nations, in which prosperity, friendship and love flourish among equals.

Pipe and materials to furnish a Latin American village with a steady supply of drinkable water have to be got across a river and halfway up a mountain: men, women and children from the village carry them.

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The Other Americas

Where Communism Is Strong—and Why

by Daniel James

On January 15, 1953, John Foster Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then considering his nomination as Secretary of State, that:

> I have a feeling conditions in . . . Latin America are somewhat comparable to conditions as they were in China in the mid-30's, when the Communist movement was getting started; they were beginning to develop hatred of the American and the Britisher, but we didn't do anything adequate about it. It went on and on, and then finally it came to a climax in 1949.
>
> Well, if we don't look out, we will wake up some morning and read in the newspapers that there happened in South America the same kind of thing that happened in China in '49.

Twice since then we have read that the "same kind of thing" came within a hairsbreadth of happening on these shores. On October 8, 1953, England had to dispatch troops to her South American colony, British Guiana, to oust from office a Red government. On June 18, 1954, anti-Communist exiles launched an armed revolution to overthrow the Red-dominated government of Guatemala in Central America. Within nine months of Dulles' prophecy, Latin America twice was the scene of a war with Communism—something unprecedented in the history of the Western Hemisphere.

Fortunately, our two clashes with Communism on American soil have been short-lived and not very sanguinary (although we must not forget the still uncounted numbers who were tortured and assassinated in true Soviet style by Guatemala's former rulers). One occurred in a colony of no major significance, and one in a republic that is small and weak. Nevertheless, those conflicts reverberated throughout the globe as well as the hemisphere. British Guiana was hotly debated from London to New Delhi, and Guatemala strife occasioned the second emergency meeting in the history of the United Nations Security Council. It became abundantly clear that we had had a brush not with native radicals in two out-of-the-way places but with the probing fingers of an incipient Soviet conspiracy against the Americas.

Now, 14 months after the Welsh Fusiliers landed in Georgetown, the issue in British Guiana is far from resolved. The Churchill Government has just approved a Colonial Office report which recommends "a period of marking time in the advance toward self-government"—dooms the colony, in other words, to martial rule indefinitely. This prospect angers nearly every British Guianese. Although their condition was caused by the recklessness and irresponsibility of the Red-created People's Progressive Party and its Communist leadership, the people, in the absence of a legitimate native nationalist party that might take up their grievances against Britain, are again turning to the PPP out of sheer frustration. Private advices state flatly that if a democratic election were held today the PPP would be returned to power by an overwhelming vote. In the offing, they intimate, is a new explosion.

And five months after the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmàn, Communism has not been rooted out of Guatemala. A Red underground has already come into being and distributes clandestine literature; in Mexico exiled Communists and Arbencistas plot a forcible return to power. Within the anti-Communist coalition which rules Guatemala flourish the divisions that have always existed among Guatemalan anti-Commu-

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Daniel James is the author of Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude *recently published by John Day.*

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nists, but they are now more dangerous than ever before.

Guatemala's new President, Carlos Castillo Armas, so far has done a remarkable job of steering a democratic course and laying a basis for his country's reconstruction. The question is whether anti-Communist factionalism plus renewed Communist activity will not combine to thwart Castillo Armas' intentions.

Communism in Latin America generally has become more, not less, threatening since Moscow's defeats in British Guiana and Guatemala. Regardless of local gains in the struggle against Communism, the situation as a whole favors the Communists because of underlying and unchanged conditions. These essentially are the same as those in Asia; they can be summed up in a familiar phrase: the area is socially, economically and politically backward. And this is not a problem of exclusive concern to do-gooders; Latin America's backwardness is a menace to every man, woman and child in the United States.

El Salvador—rural clinic

The nearly 175 million inhabitants of the 20 republics and 18 major colonies south of the Rio Grande—the fastest-growing population in the world, it will total 500 million by the year 2000—are fed up with the tyranny, poverty, disease, illiteracy, corruption, landlordism, peonism and all the myriad evils which have kept Latin America out of the mainstream of Western development since it achieved independence. They want industrialization, division of the land, modern education, trade unions and also radios, refrigerators and automobiles. And they want all of these things immediately. In the age of atomic energy, the structure of Latin American society seems so anachronistic as to be utterly intolerable to growing numbers of people and makes them anxious to effect a drastic change overnight. The surge toward change is so overwhelming that it lends itself to extremist and demagogic manipulation. It is at exactly this point that Communism enters as the gravest threat.

Aware before Secretary Dulles of the fundamental analogy between Latin America and China, Moscow is employing in Latin America the doctrine which proved successful in China: "Maoism." The essence of the Maoist strategy followed by all the Latin American Communist Parties—and hence the heart of the problem we face—is the deliberate and effective exploitation of nationalism. As in the China of the 1930s, nationalism is dominant in the Latin America of the 1950s. And here nationalism means, as did Chinese nationalism, to quote Dulles, "hatred of the American" (and him alone, since the "Britisher" is no longer important below the Rio Grande). Anti-US feeling—whether appearing as reasoned opposition to "Yankee imperialism" or unreasoned *anti-yanquismo*—is rampant.

This sentiment was not created by Communist propaganda, and it is not the monopoly of the Communists; it stems from both real and fancied grievances against the United States, some of them historical, and is manifested by Latin Americans of all political persuasions and walks of life. It is most pronounced, however, among the educated classes—the politicians, intellectuals and businessmen who inflame the masses in order to obtain their support for political or personal enterprises.

Communist policy is to fan the flames of nationalism even higher. Alliances are formed with nationalist groups, frequently those of a reactionary or fascist nature, for the sole purpose of turning an entire country against the United States. Under cover of such alliances, the Communists infiltrate key positions in the government as well as the most important national institutions and organizations, and try to capture power. In Latin America, as in pre-Communist China and more recently in Indo-China, they do not try to sell the people proletarian revolution or a socialized economy but "national liberation" (from "Yankee imperialism") and "agrarian reform."

No Latin American Communist Party is strong enough, at the moment, to seize power. The danger lies, rather, in the alliance of nationalist and Communist forces that has taken place in some countries and which could, under certain circumstances, spread over most of Latin America. It is not difficult to visualize the enormously complicated and dangerous situation which would confront the United States if ultranationalist governments generally tolerant of Communist aims, not to speak of nationalist-Communist coalition governments, began to appear in Latin America. Communism achieved dominance in Guatemala essentially through the nationalist movement. A somewhat similar situation now obtains in Chile, which may be about to become "another Guatemala."

Chile is on the verge of sheerest economic and political chaos. She is in the grip of a wild inflation which has seen living costs soar one-third within the past 18 months while the main source of income, copper, has fallen sharply in price. To meet its obligations, the government has been printing money at a rapid rate, thus aggravating the inflation. The workers, unhappy over the steady drop in value of the peso, have struck for higher wages in virtually every industry this year. The crisis has been hopelessly complicated by government inefficiency and confusion.



New power plant in Chile

It is almost a euphemism to speak of Chile's having a government right now. President Carlos Ibañez del Campo must be blessed with supernatural backing, for

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he governs—if one may use that word—without a party, without a popular base, without a legislative majority, without a stable cabinet, without a program. Elected in 1952 largely on the strength of his promise to end inflation, Ibañez, a septuagenarian, has failed not only to halt rising prices but also a rising Red tide.

The Communists have profited immensely. They have formed a front with the nationalists, including a pro-Nazi wing, which is the dominant political factor in Chile. During a recent 10-month period when the United States refused to pay 35 cents a pound for copper that was selling at around 29 cents on the market, the front pictured us as attempting to strangle Chile economically and nearly persuaded Chile's Congress to sell copper to Russia. Congress voted *unanimously* to condemn "aggression" in Guatemala months before civil war broke out; during the war, the front organized anti-US demonstrations and burned Eisenhower in effigy. Congress has just vetoed a state of siege decree, which Ibañez, taking advantage of a Congressional recess, had promulgated in a desperate effort to deal with what his Interior Minister termed Communist "rebellion." The legislature's action flouted a law which bans Communist activities and thus put the Communist Party above the law and above the government. Under such circumstances, it is hard to see how Chile can avoid turning either to military rule or a pro-Red regime.

Peru dusts against typhus

In Brazil, bitter political strife rages between an ultra-nationalist-Communist front and a loose alliance of moderate nationalists. President Getulio Vargas' suicide last summer had a polarizing effect. Vargas' own Labor Party entered into a more or less formal understanding with the Reds, whom he had consistently befriended, thus uniting the extremists; his successor, Joao Café Filho, at once became the rallying point of the moderates. The latter have won the first round, the October Congressional and State elections; but the showdown will come in 1956 when a successor to Café, who cannot succeed himself, must be elected—or perhaps before then if the present economic crisis gets much worse.

Brazil's Communist Party is the most formidable in the Americas. The Chilean party, with an estimated 40,000 members, is proportionately larger than the 60 to 100,000-member Brazilian party. But the latter boasts hordes of sympathizers, a press larger than that of any capitalist party—it includes six dailies and 24 periodicals—a guerrilla army, and a leader who is the most popular and cleverest Red in Latin America, Luiz Carlos Prestes.

Brazil, like Chile, faces her worst economic crisis. Living costs have gone up 25 percent in two years and the cruzeiro has fallen accordingly. Coffee, Brazil's main support as copper is Chile's, is dropping steadily in price. The government is chronically short of dollar exchange, has a swollen deficit and is heavily indebted; yet it is prohibited by nationalist sentiment from encouraging foreign capital to come in and develop the country's immense resources and so create the wealth needed to solve the crisis. The Army is Café Filho's chief bulwark. If he should falter in his handling of the economy, which requires sheer wizardry, the Army would probably replace him with a general. Only that could stop Communism.

A sharp left turn in Brazil or Chile would be likely to upset the delicate balance in a third South American republic, Bolivia, which is unique in several respects.

Bolivia is the only backward country to make a social revolution which started out as pro-Communist then turned against Communism. President Victor Paz Estenssoro's government is living proof that revolutionary nationalism can follow a path independent of Communism and that in order to achieve its goals it must combat Communism. Paz Estenssoro has initiated a genuine agrarian reform which promises to lead to individual ownership and not collectivism, and has nationalized the absentee-owned tin mines without making nationalization a political fetish calculated to scare off needed foreign investment.

Bolivia is also the only case on record where the United States succeeded in driving a wedge between revolutionary nationalism and Communism, and thus helped prevent a Communist take-over without going to war. In Bolivia, we realized that it was either Paz Estenssoro or something worse—nationalist revolution or Communist revolution. Without fanfare, we backed the nationalists to the tune of $14 million in economic aid and helped keep them in power. The price was dirt cheap. What mattered was that most of it, $8 million, was in the form of surplus wheat and flour which helped prevent starvation in Bolivia this past winter—a deed which cannot be measured in dollars and cents. And what mattered, too, was that we acted in time and with dispatch—something that may have given us a psychological edge with Bolivia's nationalist rulers which we do not have with their counterparts elsewhere. It may well be that in our Bolivian policy we have found the key to what is perhaps our most perplexing, and certainly one of our most pressing foreign-policy problems: how to deal with those who lead the two-thirds of the world we call "backward."

Equador—milkmaid and child

Bolivia suggests, also, the kind of policy we might pursue in those Latin American countries where Com-

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munism is not an immediate danger but could swiftly become so if the present rate of economic deterioration is permitted to continue. Bolivia, for example, can never hope to escape the ever-present possibility that an Arbenz may succeed Paz Estenssoro unless her wretched economic plight is attacked on a planned, long-term basis and with adequate resources. Here is not a question of handouts, but of helping the Bolivians build a new economic engine to power their national life. They need desperately to reduce their dependence upon tin—which ultimately means upon our purchases of tin—and to develop their land as a potentially more reliable source of food (one-third of which they now import) and a sounder basis for the economy; an agricultural assistance program over a five-year period might put Bolivia on the road to diversification. Much is made of this point because Bolivia's case is typical.

The mistakes we made in Asia and the damage we wrought there should be the grimmest warning of what we might expect if we repeat ourselves in Latin America. No second chance will be given us this time. Latin America has become the acid test not merely of our ability to lead a world in revolution but of our capacity to survive in it. It is obvious, though few of us realize it, that Latin America is more important to our existence than Europe or Asia. Our Europocentrism, and recently our preoccupation with Asia, have blinded us to some elementary facts of life the foremost of which is that we share a hemisphere with the Latin Americans and not the Europeans or Asians. A second fact of life is that we are helplessly dependent upon our southern neighbors for the most basic materials consumed by our industrial and defense machines. A third is that our very national defense is predicated upon the Caribbean rather than the Mediterranean, and upon the goodwill of the people of the West Indies before that of the East Indies.

An Empty Briefcase at Rio

by Tom Fitzsimmons

EARLY in the Spring of this year, our Secretary of State went to the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Venezuela, determined to do one thing and one thing only. In Guatemala, the long-talked about, but in effect ignored, possibility that Communists would establish a center of power in a part of the Western Hemisphere ripe for their work had become a harsh reality. And Dulles wanted the conference to produce a flat warning that the "domination or control of the political institutions of any American state by the international Communist movement" would be resisted by all the American states as a threat to their "sovereignty and political independence."

The other delegates came to Caracas hoping to make a start toward solving the many economic and social problems plaguing their peoples. Those from the few Latin American nations with a tradition of democracy wanted to broaden the US resolution into a statement critical of all forms of totalitarian regimes and a promise that the people of Latin America would not eventually have to choose between statism or economic stagnation, but would be given the alternative of improving their lot while remaining or becoming free men. But Dulles knew he could get the various Latin American regimes to agree to be *against* Communism, but not to be *for* any specific alternative; he wanted a show of strength and a simple statement which the Communists could not mock. He won. But there was a price for victory: a promise that all that had been set aside would be taken up later, that the US would immediately re-examine her Latin American policy and return later in the year prepared to discuss, in new terms, ways and means of doing for the American states what since the war she had done for Europe.

The Economic Conference just ended at Rio de Janeiro is the result of that promise. It was to be an important—even an epoch-making—conference. The expectations which it aroused among Latin Americans could hardly be exaggerated. And it has produced one or two positive results. But when compared with the job to be done and the opportunity presented, these amount to a few faltering steps in what should have been a brisk marathon start. And the fault is squarely ours.

At Rio, the delegates had to make the best of a bad thing. That it would be bad had been known for some weeks past, ever since it became clear that what we would offer had been decided not by the State Department and men long familiar with Latin American problems, but by Treasury Secretary George Humphrey. How inadequate that offer would be was indicated by the resignation, on the eve of the conference, of our delegate to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Ambassador Merwin L. Bohan, the resignation, earlier, of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Cabot, and the refusal of the President's brother Milton Eisenhower to join the US delegation.

After making, at the President's request, a 5-week fact-finding tour last year, Milton Eisenhower filed a report suggesting what the broad lines of a new US Latin American policy should be. His ideas, although conservative, are not Humphrey's; they have been ignored. John Cabot, a career foreign service officer since 1926,

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has spent the bulk of those years in Latin America and is one of our best-informed experts on the area. He was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs by President Eisenhower, and he accompanied Milton Eisenhower on his fact-finding trip. He helped write the report Humphrey has ignored. He now is our Ambassador to Sweden.

Merwin Bohan has worked with Latin American economic problems, for the State and Commerce Departments as well as for private industry, since 1917. Although retired from government service, he was asked to return as US Ambassador to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council because of the respect with which he was regarded by Latin American officials. A hard trader and scrupulously honest, Bohan has been one of the most effective spokesmen we have had in Latin America. He stayed with his job as long as there seemed hope of influencing Humphrey's stand. On September 21 he met behind closed doors in Washington with representatives of the Latin American nations to present a pre-conference "formal United States policy statement." It consisted of five paragraphs of platitudes and generalities: the United States is interested in the economic development of the American Republics; the United States is prepared to lend technical assistance; the United States urges the Republics to use "sound" methods, help themselves, and cherish private enterprise. For three hours one delegate after another, led by Costa Rica's Jorge Hozera, President of the Economic and Social Council, asked Bohan why the United States declaration had not referred to any of the specific problems which were to be taken up at Rio. They asked him in effect just what the United States position would be, for the "declaration" told them nothing they did not already know. Where was the "reexamined," the "new" United States policy?


Training center in Brazil

One supposes this reaction and its implications were reported to Humphrey; and that he was aware during the following weeks that out of every Latin American embassy in Washington came the private and informal warning that it would be far better for the security of the hemisphere to have no conference at all than one which could justly be presented to the people of Latin America as a sell-out of their hopes. Yet almost two months later, on October 27, the same empty generalities were reiterated, at length, as the official United States policy-line, in a speech by John Cabot's successor, Henry F. Holland, to the Pan American Society. A few weeks later, discouraged, Bohan resigned.

The three men—Milton Eisenhower, John Cabot, Merwin Bohan—have one characteristic in common: they are conservative, tough-minded champions of US interests in an area about which they are each better informed than George Humphrey. Why then did each of them, separately and at different times, feel required to disassociate himself from the policy-line Humphrey insisted would be held at Rio?

Treasury Secretary Humphrey is mortally convinced that private enterprise is a sacred thing—sacred not in the sense of being one essential foundation stone of a free and dynamic society, but in the sense that it is the only economic instrument free people can rightly use to better their lives and that whatever it cannot do, cannot and should not be done. This essentially is the attitude Herbert Hoover held to when the depression of the '30s reduced our living conditions to a level where such formulas for quick economic advancement as Communism and Fascism found more willing adherents in the United States than ever before or since. It is the attitude which during those years drove the people of one nation after another into accepting one of these forms of statism as the only alternative to economic stagnation. Some fortunate nations produced leaders bold enough to experiment with ways of jointly using both private and public enterprise so as to avoid the extremes, and the worst evils, of either. The experiment worked for us and the other free, industrial nations of the world. But those in which the experiment failed or was not tried now challenge us everywhere. For the nations which are just beginning to enter the industrial age—and whose people today live in subhuman conditions which we never had to endure in our darkest days—are now in the process of choosing between our way, which preserves freedom, and the statist way which demands its sacrifice. They will choose and they will act. And they are in a hurry. One, China with its 500 million people, already has chosen.

Latin America today contains 171 million people—in 25 years the figure will be 275 million: it is the fastest growing population in the world. Contrary to what is thought, these people have made amazing progress during the past 10 years—since 1945 the gross national product of Latin America has grown by 50 percent; they started with very little, but have made progress enough to have learned what can be had. There are things which need to be done in Latin America, that these people insist be done, and fast, which private enterprise alone cannot do, should not be asked to do. And if the vast tasks which do not return an immediate profit in currency are left undone because private enterprise is worshiped instead of used, these people are likely to listen to those who argue that only by abolishing all private enterprise will the job get done.

Worker in rubber factory

The position of Milton Eisenhower, John Cabot, Mer-

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win Bohan, is that the synthesis of public and private enterprise which enabled this country constantly to raise the living conditions of its people while defending itself in one hot war and the whole of the West in one cold war provides the best instrument for blocking further totalitarian expansion anywhere in the world. They see no point in chanting the virtues of private enterprise to people whose colonial past requires that they be convinced, by results, that private enterprise can help them solve their particular problems, not hinder them. The three men are not alone in this view. Most experts on the needs of underdeveloped countries agree with them, as does, for example, Wall Street banker Eugene Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). But Humphrey will not see it so. And Humphrey ruled at Rio.

Thatched hut to new brick home

Humphrey's purpose differs not at all from that of men like John Cabot, or for that matter from that of Latin American spokesmen. Everybody agrees that present conditions in Latin America are hand-tailored to Communist tastes, that the United States in its own self-interest must do something, a great deal, about it, and that there has been just enough criminal irresponsibility in the past behavior of United States corporations working in the area (and enough United States Government intervention to protect these corporations from their just deserts) to make our motives suspect for a long time and our job more difficult. But viewed against the utter disagreement as to methods, this sharing of goals is perhaps the most frightening aspect of the split in Administration thinking revealed by Rio: it has not influenced Humphrey to change his mind one bit, and it has shown the total power granted him to make policy in this matter.

To achieve the common goal, Latin American nations ask that the flow of capital into their area be boosted to the neighborhood of $1 billion a year and, since most of them depend entirely on one or two products, usually raw materials, to earn the foreign currency they must have to buy food and machinery, that some scheme be worked out to prevent the price of those exports from rising and falling like a crow gone mad. It is perfectly true, as Humphrey says so often, that the Latin American countries must themselves take on by far the biggest part of the job of raising capital and stabilizing their economies. And it does no harm to remind them from time to time, and convince them, that we are not going to do their work for them. But since we buy more and sell more to Latin America than to any other continent, flow of capital and stability of prices depend largely upon our actions. Without our help, and a lot of it, Latin America could mount herculean efforts only to see them negated by the number of new mouths which each day demand more food, and by inflation.

Private investment from the United States can be the largest single, long-range source of capital for Latin America. There is a lot of American money already in these countries. To get more they will have to overcome the distrust, and relax the resulting measures, which past excesses of US companies like United Fruit have caused; and the US can help by making it plain that our government will not condone such practices in the future. Specifically, we have been asked to provide tax incentives to stimulate private investment. Humphrey has agreed to suggest a "study" of the matter.

The traditional movement of American private capital, however, has been from a US firm into the development of raw materials it needs for its plants back home, or into bananas and coffee—a kind of investment which, although important to Latin America, does not help these nations to diversify their economy and break away from a colonial-like dependence upon the sale of one or two products abroad to buy the food and manufactured goods. And for some years now, the flow of profits from Latin America to the US has exceeded the amount of new American capital going in.

Everybody in the United States is accustomed to borrowing money for things which they need but cannot pay for all at once. No nation in the process of industrializing can pay for all the required equipment, fuel, experts, etc., out of its current earnings abroad. It must buy on credit, repaying the loans with the extra income industrialization brings. At present Latin American enterprises can get credit from the Export-Import Bank, but only for the purchase of American goods transported in American ships, and from the World Bank, but only if the government of the country will guarantee the loan—how many US enterprises would our government have guaranteed?

Carrying pipes for a water line

The fact that these two sources of credit are not sufficient finally got through to Humphrey—and on the very eve of the Rio conference came the dramatic announcement that he had reversed his opposition to a long time dormant proposal for an International Finance Corporation which would arrange credits without requiring government guarantees. A step forward, but a very small one: the proposal is scheduled to be put before Congress in 1956; the Corporation's assets will amount to only $100 million.

It is revealing of Humphrey's fixation that whenever the question of more credit was raised at Rio, he insisted that these three sources were more than sufficient, especially since the amount available to the Export-Import Bank had lately been boosted. But all three sources are rigidly limited as to the risks they can take. Each is a

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ENOUGH is known about the military importance of the Panama Canal and its approaches. Far less is known about the crucial importance of Latin American resources to US military—and non-military—production: of the 12 materials listed as strategic in World War II, 11 are available in quantity in Latin America: copper, manganese, chromium, tungsten, tin, antimony, bauxite, etc. And Latin America contains enormous quantities of oil, iron ore, rubber and wood. Every day, as we decimate our own resources, our neighbors to the South become more essential to our security and well being.

Yet reports from traders, backed up by the statistical studies of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, reveal that the rate of increase of capital investment and of economic development in Latin America, fairly satisfactory in the first postwar years, has begun to fall off alarmingly, as has the level of Latin American trade with the United States and Canada. Industrial output, which averaged a 7.7 percent annual increase from 1945 to 1951, dropped to its lowest postwar rate in 1953—only 1.3 percent. Gross capital investment, including both new and replacement capital, dropped from a rate of 18 percent to about 14.3 percent. The annual rate of increase in per capita gross product has fallen from 3.2 percent to a tiny 0.7 percent. The relationship of these figures to ability to purchase abroad is obvious. Ordinary US exports to Latin America ran to more than $3.6 billion in 1951. Only a shade lower in 1952, they dropped in 1953 to $2.9 billion, minus 20 percent.

One of the greatest problems for the underdeveloped countries in this hemisphere, and throughout the world, is the fact that their economic life, based upon one or two items either grown or extracted from the earth, is at the absolute mercy of fluctuations in world market prices. Eleven of the 20 Latin-American countries depend on one commodity for 55 percent or more of their exports (and five of those for over 75 percent). For six others, just two commodities make up over half their total exports. Of the remaining three, Peru is only slightly more diversified, with cotton and sugar making up 48 percent. This leaves only Mexico and Argentina, where four and five products share the major part of the market. It is easy to understand the need for such price and market stabilization measures as long-term purchase agreements, which would make it possible for some of these countries to find the income stability they need to participate in long-range financial planning.

business proposition designed to deal in self-liquidating projects. And no country can possibly come into the industrial 20th Century until, for example, long and expensive sanitation and health campaigns free its people from the diseases that ruin their ability to produce, until enough of them are given the basic schooling they must have before they can be given technical training, until decent housing and decent medical care give them an incentive to do more than is necessary just to remain alive. And what of the highways and railroads, the bridges which would open immense areas now inaccessible to farming and industry, but themselves produce no profit? Some, but very few, such projects are undertaken by the bigger corporations, and then slowly. Some can be, and are being, financed by local governments. But the scale and the pace required demands credit: government loans at interest rates way below what banks can afford, or no interest at all. And grants, as few as possible and carefully given, but given without pretense.

Since the war, the United States has given, outright, to wealthy Belgium and tiny Luxembourg three times more than to all 20 Latin American nations.

At Rio, Humphrey pushed his insistence that existing credit sources were sufficient even to the point of opposing a "help yourself" Chilean proposal to establish a strictly Latin-American stabilization fund. Fortunately, the Congressional advisers to the delegation—Sens. Wiley (R, Wis.), Capehart (R, Ind.) and Smathers (D, Fla.)—and a Republican observer, Rep. James G. Fulton of Pennsylvania, succeeded in softening this opposition.

Toward the end of the conference, Representative Fulton called a few newsmen together and said "Humphrey came down here with an empty briefcase. The American delegation was told to keep its mouth shut and get it over with as fast as possible." He objected; he did not need an altruistic reason: there are 375,000 unemployed in his district, "industrialization would make these countries the customers we need."

At Rio, our foreign economic policy in action could be compared to the generalizations pouring out of Washington. For that reason, government observers from all over the world, and especially from Asia, came to the conference. Humphrey's empty briefcase was what they saw—at the very moment when the White House, the State Department and the Foreign Operations Administration all were announcing that the next phase of Cold War strategy would see a shift of emphasis from military to a "long-range economic security policy, particularly in Asia."

The East and West are approaching a military standoff. There are a billion people—and more each day—living in the underdeveloped regions of the world. They are not going to live their present kind of life forever. Some are choosing a way out now; others will soon. Our job is to convince them that our way is the best. So the shift in emphasis from a military to an economic buildup is sound. But again there is the frightening possibility that agreement on goals masks a deep division on methods. If Humphrey's line at Rio indicates, as it did to most observers there, that this Administration thinks it can win the enthusiasm of a billion people on the march by offering them only one part of the fused private-and-public enterprise approach which has made this nation, and by pinching pennies instead of facing up to our duties as the world's only major source of capital and credit, we are in for some disheartening defeats.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

New Italian Writing: Polar Extremes

by Paolo Milano

WESTERN CULTURE as a whole, and each national culture in particular, has been in a state of impermanence for so long that mere acknowledgment of the fact means little or nothing at all. Reflecting on Italian literature, this last summer in Italy, (I had been meeting again old and young writers and eagerly reading their latest books), I avoided as long as I could to think in such hollow terms as "change," "crisis," etc. Yet, as the months passed and my conclusions ripened, I could no longer refute the evidence: Italian literature *is* in a state of transition, which has a specific character and very concrete reasons of its own.

Here are a few symptoms. For decades, until 1940 or so, Italian writers had considered French culture a model, or at least a natural complement of their own. French books were reviewed in the Italian press long before a translation appeared, and some never were translated, simply because so many Italians had read them in the original. But today, one meets in Italy young men who are proficient in English, German or Russian, though they have no more than a smattering of French.

The hold that German culture had on Italian scholarship is equally shaken. In the 1940's, American literature cast a spell on some good young writers, and its effects could be felt in their work. Today, however, the influence of American culture, while it grows stronger by the year in the social sciences, is hardly noticeable in Italian fiction. Nor is the influence of any other foreign culture in the ascendancy.

Or take a national aspect of the same problem. For the last fifty years, the philosophy of Benedetto Croce—a revised Hegelianism, with an emphasis on aesthetics and, in politics, on moderate liberalism—has been the accepted frame of reference of Italian culture. Whether followers or opponents of Croce, Italian intellectuals communicated and battled in the terms of his system. Now, less than two years after Croce's death, the dominance of his thought is already on the wane. Other doctrines—Existentialism, Marxism, American Empiricism—are fighting for the succession, but none seems likely to win the day.

Today, a cultivated Italian may find it hard to answer, however tentatively, even the tourist's hackneyed question: "Who is the greatest Italian writer alive?". In 1910, without hesitation, he would have answered: "D'Annunzio." In 1930: "Pirandello." But in 1954, no primacy any longer goes unquestioned, for both popular taste and critical opinion are in a state of flux.

THE TWO books that, this summer, were awarded the country's chief literary prizes are in such a sharp contrast in every respect that the fact that both could be selected in the same season is symptomatic in itself.

The "Premio Strega" went to a novel by Mario Soldati, *Le Lettere da Capri* (*Letters from Capri*), the two main characters of which are American. Soldati, who lived in this country 20 years ago, wrote a number of delicate stories with an American background, later collected under the title *America, First Love.* His only work available in English—three novellas collectively entitled *Dinner with the Commendatore* —shows that the lesson of Henry James was not lost on him. By profession a successful movie-director, Soldati is a thoughtful, not a prolific writer; *Letters from Capri* is his first full-fledged novel.

Its hero, Harry, is an American art-historian living in Italy. He is a Protestant; his wife Jane is an American Catholic. In Italy, Harry has discovered the Flesh—in the body of his opulent mistress, a Roman prostitute called Dorothea. Often and remorsefully, however, he goes back to his wife and to their tender conjugal love, but only to find out again and again that body and soul are two, not one, and that his sensual obsession for Dorothea is ineradicable. The climax of the novel comes when Jane confesses to her husband that she has gone through a parallel experience: an Italian male animal keeps her in a similar bondage. Her five letters from Capri to her lover—uncanny documents of a mystical sexual abjection—are given in full at the end of the book.

The novel as a whole, engineered with the utmost skill, is itself more a document than a work of art. More than the psychology of two American expatriates, it reflects the Italian intellectual's myth of American "psychology." Latin clarity versus Northern mist, Roman acceptance of pleasure and sin versus American scrupulosity. In spite of subtle qualifications and firm craftsmanship, Mario Soldati's novel is stubbornly geared on a Manichean view of the "transatlantic story," which, on this side of the ocean, not many are willing to share. International understanding, the reader is forced to conclude, is not any easier in the field of psychology than in the field of politics.

Mario Soldati's *Letters from Capri* is an Italian's attempt to disclose the inner conflicts of Europe's American "masters." The majority of Italian writers, however, are going the opposite way. Psychological analysis is frowned upon, and social consciousness is the order of the day. Thus, Italy's most coveted literary award, the "Premio Viareggio," went this year not to a novel nor to a biography, but to *Contadini del Sud* (*Peasants from the South*), a slim volume of sociological sketches by Rocco Scotellaro, a promising poet, who died last year at the age of thirty-two.

A CRITIC has called Scotellaro "the Italian Dylan Thomas." No comparison could be more misleading —for Rocco Scotellaro, born "beyond Eboli" in a small Lucanian village, shared with the Italian writers of his generation a distaste for metaphysics and an urge to commune with the people. The most powerful motive in the young Italian writers of these last years seems to be a sense of social duty. Specifically, many of them are eager to do literary justice to those unknown toilers of Italy's Deep South, which Ignazio Silone, Carlo Levi—and Giovanni Verga long before them—introduced into Italian fiction.

Contadini del Sud is a presentation of documents on peasant life in his native

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Lucania, which Rocco Scotellaro had begun to collect when death overtook him. The bulk of this posthumous book, lovingly edited by the writer's friends, consists of five "life-histories," as told to the poet by the peasants themselves. Its originality lies in the fact that Scotellaro insisted on remaining a poet, while working as an investigator.

He believed in the story of a man's life as opposed to his "case-history," and he felt that the results, even in the strictly sociological sense, would be immensely enriched through this approach.

It is not for me to pass judgment on this thorny point; furthermore, the book is only a fragment of an unfinished work. I wanted to report on it, however sketchily, because this is the *kind* of book for which a great number of Italian *writers* seem to feel a natural sympathy. We are far, very far from the present temper of American literature. To find an equivalent trend in the literature of this country, one ought to go back to the 1930's, to the time of James Agee's *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men*.

If I could discuss now a dozen, or so, other works of fiction, which I also read with pleasure and interest, they would fall naturally, I believe, into one or the other of the areas I have tried to define: Soldati's cosmopolitan territory, or Scotellaro's native grounds.

Jews and Revolutions

by Maurice J. Goldbloom

MR. TELLER concludes his book with the unexceptionable statement:

> The fate of the society we cherish hinges on the recuperative-restorative powers and adjustment capacities of liberalism—on the willingness of conservative liberalism to press as fervently for social justice as for civil liberties, and of socialist liberalism to defend civil liberties as passionately as social justice. For when these two aims are separated, neither aim prevails.

Because this statement is so true, it is the more regrettable that so little of the book which precedes it seems animated by its spirit, and so few of the statements Mr. Teller makes can be accepted as unreservedly.

Scapegoat of Revolution, by Judd L. Teller (Scribners; $4.50).

There are two main theses advanced in the book. The first of these, that social upheavals have almost invariably brought woe to the Jews, is indisputable. Anything which disrupts the established order, however bad that order may be, tends to disrupt the normal processes of life and to unleash those uglier aspects of human behavior which are normally held in check by the power of the state. Those who are weakest, whether as members of minorities or for any other reason, are the first victims. And in Western society, the Jews have usually been not only weak; even worse, they have been easily distinguishable as weak.

But it does not follow from this that revolutions are unmixed evils, even for those who suffer immediately at their hands. While Mr. Teller does not explicitly take quite this extreme position, his selection of material is such as to convey that impression. And he comes very close to asserting it when he writes:

> Social revolution has too often brought adversity upon the Jew. . . . The only exceptions were the constitutional revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Humanist in impulse. Yet even some of these brought a surplus of agony and torment to the Jew, over and above the sufferings inflicted on the rest of the population.

Actually, minorities such as the Jews tend in the long run to benefit from all revolutions — whatever the spirit in which they are conducted or the motivation behind them — which lead to a more open society by breaking one group's monopoly of power.

Mr. Teller's second main thesis is that Jews don't like revolutions and have never liked revolutions, and that those Jews who take part in revolutionary movements are a negligible minority and not really Jews in any case. This is not a new thesis; one can easily see why many Jews, not themselves revolutionists, have been eager to subscribe to it. But it is a thesis which can only be maintained by subjecting the facts to a Procrustean distortion, which Mr. Teller does. He starts with the statement:

> Contrary to a popular myth, the Jew has generally been conservative. . . . His conservatism was born during his first exilic experience in Babylon. When the Jews returned to Zion, they were a restrained and chastened people, no longer obsessed with prophecy, concerned now with law and statesmanship and inclined toward compromise.

The prophetic tradition which Mr. Teller so cavalierly repudiates is and always has been, for many Jews, the central distinctive feature of Judaism. Again he writes:

> The Jew who renounces his basic traditions very often loses also the ability of adaptation which is a concomitant element of this tradition and the secret of Jewry's survival. Hence, the more radical he is, the less Jewish he is.

Or, in regard to Russia:

> The Jews were not the least important of the minorities. . . . The revolution was eager to use this reservoir of manpower. However, the Jews were not eager to lend themselves to its uses.

To support this claim, he minimizes the role of Jews in the Narodnaya Volya, claiming that none were involved in the assassination of Alexander II except through "guilt by association." (In fact one was in charge of the headquarters for the assassins and another was rejected as the actual assassin simply because the group feared that there would be reprisals against the Jews as a group—a fact which Mr. Teller neglects to mention in his eagerness to accuse Narodnaya Volya of indifference to the fate of the Jews. He asserts that "few Jews, except those who had completely renounced their Jewish ties, were involved in the second, the totalitarian revolution under Lenin." In fact, Jews such as Trotzky, Zinoviev, Radek, and Kamenev may be said to have "renounced their Jewish heritage" in precisely the same sense that Lenin can be said to have renounced his Russian heritage. They were thought of as Jews by others, both in and outside of the Communist movement, and thought of themselves as such—although certainly not in either a religious or a nationalist sense. Mr. Teller also ignores the role of Jews in

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the Socialist parties of Russia under the Tsar, with the sole exception of the specifically Jewish Bund. (This he describes as "pseudo-Zionism"—a description which fits the Bund about as well as "creeping Socialism" fits Sinclair Weeks.) But in fact, the Menshevik leadership was largely Jewish while Dr. I. N. Steinberg, the Left Social Revolutionary leader who served as Minister of Justice in Lenin's first cabinet, was not only Jewish but religiously Orthodox.

SIMILARLY, Mr. Teller tries to minimize the role of Jews in the Socialist and Communist movements of the West. He quotes a statement by Max Beer that Jewish Socialist leaders such as Ferdinand Lassalle, Rosa Luxemburg, and Leon Trotsky would not have become Socialists in England or France. The facts, however, point in a different direction. In the history of the French Socialist Party, Leon Blum's is only the most illustrious of a whole roster of Jewish names which includes Daniel Mayer, Jules Moch, Louis Levy, Solomon Grumbach, and Jean Zyromski. In Britain, as in France, Jews are less than one percent of the total population. But there were three Jewish members in the last Labor government—Emanuel Shinwell, George Isaacs, and George Strauss—and others in previous Labor ministries, while Jewish Labor MP's are far too numerous to mention. In this country, Mr. Teller goes so far as to suggest that "It was probably then (1891) that [Abraham] Cahan's disaffection for Socialism began." This must certainly have the late editor of the *Jewish Daily Forward* whirling in his grave. His conception of Socialism certainly changed in the course of the 60 years between 1891 and his death in 1951, but his sense of membership in and loyalty to the international Socialist movement never did. This reviewer well remembers how, at the age of 87, the gravely ill Cahan left his sickbed in order to sit on the platform with the late German Socialist leader Kurt Schumacher when the latter visited this country after the war.

In discussing the American Socialist movement (briefly) and the American Communist movement (at somewhat greater length), Mr. Teller denies that the Socialists who built the Jewish trade union movement were really Socialists at heart. This has long been a Communist contention, but that does not make it true. He also accepts another myth which the Communists have at various times tried to propagate, namely, that their leadership "was always drawn from native stock." Even a superficial examination of the history of the American Communist Party will demonstrate that this has not been the case.

Mr. Teller also seeks to prove that the modern Socialist movement—as well as radicalism of other sorts, such as that of the American abolitionists—always suffered from a deep-rooted anti-Semitism. To prove this, he cites various disparaging comments on the Jews from Karl Marx, as well as from some French Socialist or anarchist writers of the nineteenth century. However, in dealing with Marx, Mr. Teller really gives the show away. For he dislikes Marx so much that he cannot resist proving that the Jews were not the only people against whom Marx was prejudiced. He quotes Marx's anti-Slav passages to prove that Marx was a racist, he similarly convicts Bakunin on a basis of *his* anti-German comments—and then, a few pages later, he agrees with both! Actually, Marx was a great thinker but a distinctly unadmirable person in many ways; it would have been easy for Mr. Teller to find, if he had been looking for them, Marxian remarks about Germans which were quite as unpleasant as the others. Essentially, Marx was a person who was never able to resist the opportunity to make a nasty remark about any individual or group. But this was a personal characteristic of Marx; it did not carry over to the movement which claimed him as a founder.

In his accusations against the French Socialist movement, Mr. Teller is on somewhat firmer ground. Here he relies on the researches of Z. Szajkowski—but he rejects the latter's conclusion that anti-Semitic tendencies never characterized the French Socialist movement as a whole and disappeared after the Dreyfus case, although offering no evidence to support his assertions to the contrary. Nevertheless, it is true that there exists in France a tradition of anti-Semitism within the working class. But no such tradition ever existed in the German working class or the German Socialist movement. Nor would it be possible to find any basis for accusing the Scandinavian, Italian, and most other continental Socialist movements of anti-Semitism. Mr. Teller is talking nonsense when he says that "throughout the nineteenth century continental Socialism was one of the two major sponsors of racism and anti-Semitism." And it is racist slander when he says:

> German anti-Semitism had impregnated all strata of society. . . . Hatred for the Jew was the secret bond that held together the royal family, the chimneysweep, and the dogcatcher; the ultra-conservatives, National Liberals, and Marxian Socialists.

There is no factual basis whatsoever for his statement that "Marxism on German soil likewise dissolved into a national movement—Nazism." The fact is that, despite all the means of terror at his disposal, Hitler never succeeded in making any significant inroads into the German working class. The leaders of the German Socialist and labor movement were killed, imprisoned, or exiled; the masses who had followed them remained impervious to the propaganda that blared at them for 12 years, and emerged from the Nazi period determined to rebuild the democracy whose principles they had never deserted. The German Socialist movement can be properly criticized for its failure to prevent Hitler from coming to power; it cannot be charged with responsibility for him in any other sense. (One might also mention—as Mr. Teller does not—that there was no period in the history of the German Socialist movement when a high percentage of its leaders were not Jews.)

It is not possible here to discuss in

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detail Mr. Teller's treatment of Zionism. In general, he counterposes it to both radicalism and assimilationism of all sorts as a specific and appropriate Jewish movement. Indeed, one is tempted to wonder whether Mr. Teller's attacks on all movements for the general salvation of the human race, and his efforts to show that Jews have consistently rejected such movements, are not merely incidental to his desire to prove that the Zionist goal of a specifically Jewish salvation is both the only proper one for Jews, and the only one they are interested in. To this reviewer, at least, it seems unlikely that the Jews can be saved if the world is not. And very little of the mass support which Zionism has received in recent years has come from persons subscribing to any such theory; most of those who supported the establishment of the State of Israel did so simply because of a humanitarian desire to find a haven for the remnant of East European Jewry who survived the war. Be that as it may, Mr. Teller is on very weak ground when he tries to dissociate the Zionist Socialist groups in their attitude toward the capitalist system in countries outside Palestine, from other Socialist parties. Mapai is affiliated with the Socialist International; some leaders of British Zionism are Bevanite members of Parliament.

In dealing with the question of Communist influence in Israel, Mr. Teller deals solely with the tiny Communist Party, called Maki, although he knows quite well that the burden of carrying the line—on all questions except Zionism—fell until very recently on the "left Socialist" Mapam, a party which continually preached the virtues of co-operating with the "people's democracies" internationally and imitating them at home. True, the majority of this party did finally bring itself to the point of criticizing the Soviet Union rather mildly when the "doctors' plot" was announced in Moscow and one of its own leaders was arrested and denounced as a Western spy in Prague. Even then, however, an extremist group of the party, led by Dr. Moshe Sneh, seceded and maintained that any criticism of the Communist countries was out of order. (Sneh had formerly, as Defense Member of the Jewish Agency, been the political head of the Zionist army Haganah and had been deeply involved in the notorious bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem shortly before the end of the mandate.) Mapam is, to be sure, a minority party. But it is a substantial minority even now, and once was considerably stronger. And its affiliates in other countries were just as pro-Soviet and pro-Communist in their orientation as was the Israeli party.

The truth is that both Israelis and Zionists outside of Israel were, aside from their Zionism, subject to the same political winds which affected the rest of the world. Mapam was the expression of the pro-Communist tendency within the Zionist movement, even though Communist rejection of Zionism prevented it from being formally Communist. And many non-Communist Zionists, in spite or perhaps because of their Zionism, were willing to make alliances with the Devil himself if they thought it would further their goal of establishing and maintaining a Jewish state in Palestine. This is not to say that they were Communists or pro-Communists; indeed, one Zionist leader who did not hesitate to engage in these tactics was simultaneously campaigning for the late Senator Taft. It is merely to say that, contrary to Mr. Teller's assertion, the Zionists were neither more perspicacious nor more scrupulous in their response to Communist blandishments than were a good many other people who should have known better and didn't.

More important than the specific errors or distortions of fact in the book (of which there are a good many in addition to those discussed here), is Teller's basic error of trying to reduce Jewish behavior to a single pattern, when no such pattern exists. Jews resemble other people in their variety, and both Jewish tradition and the behavior of contemporary Jews have many facets. Mr. Teller dislikes, with good reason, the stereotype which pictures all Jews as radicals and revolutionaries. But instead of examining the actual facts, he attempts to substitute for it another at least equally faulty stereotype more to his liking. Never in Jewish history have Jews spoken with a single voice, or in a single way. There have always been among them authoritarians and liberals, conservatives and reactionaries and radicals, followers of true prophets and of false. Sometimes their disputes have been conducted in a spirit of rationalism and freedom of enquiry, as Mr. Teller rightly points out; sometimes, on the other hand, they have hurled anathemas at one another in a spirit of intolerance that no Gentile could surpass. The intellectual adventuring of Maimonides and Ibn Gabirol brought them honor in the Jewish communities to which they belonged; the intellectual adventuring of Spinoza caused his excommunication and attempted assassination.

As long as Jews were shut in a ghetto as exiles from society, they had to abstain from participation in its quarrels; the different tendencies among them could find expression only in their internecine conflicts; when once the walls of the ghetto were breached even slightly, however, they hastened to take part in all the currents of thought and activity which were to be found in the wider society to which they now had access. Both because they were one of the underprivileged groups in that society and because modern radicalism is primarily an urban phenomenon and the Jews were overwhelmingly urban, they were attracted particularly to radical movements of all varieties. Most Jews, of course, never became active radicals—any more than most of the members of any other group ever have. And there were always other tendencies among Jews. Some feared the new freedom they glimpsed, and sought security by clinging to the ghetto where it still existed, or trying to recreate it where it did not. Others threw their support to the status quo—any status quo—because they feared the effect of an upheaval on either the fortunes of Jews as a group or of themselves personally.

But the fact remains that Jews were and are far more numerous in radical groups, proportionately, than most other sections of the population in the countries where they live. This fact may sometimes be inconvenient, but it is a natural consequence of their history. (A similar phenomenon can be observed among the Parsees of India, whose historical and social role closely parallels that of the Jews in Europe.) And in this reviewer's opinion, it is not a fact of which to be ashamed; if some Jewish radicals have strayed after false totalitarian gods, others have been in the forefront of the struggle for a better and freer world, and have thereby followed in the noblest of Jewish traditions, that of the prophets.

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The Masters of the Mobs

As a clinical examination of ten choice specimens — technically eleven, but Pa and Ma Ferguson, of Texas, really constitute one—this book is superior to anything else as yet turned out; and as an examination of the political phenomenon known as demagoguery it has great merit, although it falls somewhat short of being definitive.

With a scrupulous adherence to the documentary record that one might almost describe as loving care Mr. Luthin traces the careers of James M. Curley, Theodore C. Bilbo, William Hale Thompson, William H. Murray, Frank Hague, the Fergusons, Eugene Talmadge, Vito Marcantonio, Huey P. Long and Joseph R. McCarthy. The sketches are preceded by a chapter on "Masters of the Masses" in the early twentieth century, and followed by one on "The Mark of the Demagogue," summarizing the work. There is an introduction by Allan Nevins that is a little masterpiece.

American Demagogues by Reinhard H. Luthin (Beacon; $5).

In what it presents, the work comes close to being flawless, Mr. Luthin's industry is prodigious, his judgment is balanced and his style is lucid. His ten autopsies are conducted with a neatness and dispatch that must command the admiration of every literary pathologist. Criticism is driven from what he did to concentration on what he failed to do, and that centers pretty much on his concluding chapter in which he turns from the individual to describe the genus.

For one thing, he omits all discussion of the inconsistent demagogue. His ten specimens remained unaltered from first to last, but we have had conspicuous examples of both reformation and deformation. Pitchfork Ben Tillman, for example, began as the rankest of demagogues, but ended as a crusty, but rather valuable conservative; Tom Heflin, on the other hand, began as an admirable liberal, only to degenerate into a rabble-rouser.

His subject was demagogues, not demagoguery, so perhaps it is captious to criticize him for omitting any discussion of what might be called the hard core of demagoguery. Nevertheless, it seems to be the fact, and if it is the fact it is an important one, that a proportion of the electorate, perhaps as great as three per cent, is prepared to believe anything provided it is obviously not true. Mr. Luthin quotes Frank Kent's remark that "the great bulk of voters belong to this moronic underworld" but without agreement; yet there is much evidence that any proposition that is fantastically unreal may be expected to draw some four million adherents. These are the persons for whom the world of reality is too hard, so they are driven to take refuge in whatever fantasy is vividly presented at the moment. These are the diehard McCarthyites; they are allergic to fact, so the more McCarthy is exposed, the more frantically they adhere to him.

However, they are so small a minority that the demagogue cannot prosper with them alone; he succeeds only when circumstances drive a certain number of otherwise normal voters to join this lunatic fringe. Hysterical fear of Communism operated to make McCarthy formidable, but without it he would still have commanded several million followers.

This is the continuing menace that hangs over rational self-government and a careful analysis of it would be a contribution to the theory of democracy. Mr. Luthin does not supply it, but he does offer two suggestions that are comforting to believers in the republic. One is that it is an exceptional demagogue who exercises appreciable influence beyond one state; the other is that even within the afflicted state ten years is a long run for such a character. Four to six years will finish off most of them.

So while the picture he presents is revolting in detail, in the large it is by no means so bad. Here are ten apparitions, any one of them a potential Hitler who have appeared within the present century, yet not one of them has achieved anything permanent, except indeed, as the shock they have administered has stimulated better government in some backward areas. *American Demagogues* may furnish ammunition to some short-sighted critics of our system, but the judicious will find it rather encouraging. GERALD W. JOHNSON

A REPORT ON TOYNBEE

***The New Republic* says:** "Monumental . . . Even the small part of human history that is visible to historians is one of the most complex and mysterious of all the phenomena presented to man; and the glory of Toynbee's work—a glory that no criticism, however radical, can diminish—is that his is perhaps the first mind that has done something like justice to its complexity and mystery . . . A memory so capacious that it holds together and relates a larger tract of history than anyone before has attempted to embrace, much less to interpret . . . No book that deals with human affairs has been more free from the blatant parochialisms of our age and our civilization: the obsessions of nationalism, the exaltation of Hellenic and later European civilization at the expense of nineteen other significant societies, our excessive pride in material conquests and mechanical productivity, the notion that our age is the climax of human existence and that its ephemeral values are eternal ones . . . Yet if our world civilization survives its threatened ordeals, *A Study of History* will stand out as a landmark, perhaps even a turning point."—LEWIS MUMFORD

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Art and Industry

OF THE DOZENS of revolutions that have taken place in our lifetime without our being fully aware of them, one of the most significant occurred in architecture. An outstanding leader of the revolution was Gropius, a native of Berlin, the scion of a family of painters, architects, and art educators. Giedion's

Walter Gropius, by Siegfried Giedion (Reinhold; $10); *A Decade of Contemporary Architecture,* by Siegfried Giedion (Wittenborn; $9.50).

monograph—the first on Gropius available in English—reminds us that "many things nowadays taken for granted were only brought to birth with great difficulty and by deep personal devotion after defeats, suspicion and threats." In 1910 when Gropius began the practice of architecture in the German capital it was still customary to disguise even industrial buildings as Baroque palaces or Gothic castles as if to conceal the use of contemporary building materials.

Forty-three years before the Manufacturers' Trust building rose on New York's Fifth Avenue, Gropius built a shoe-last factory in a North German town—his first clear break with tradition: a flat roof resting on a steel-framed structure, the glass walls, instead of carrying and supporting the building, merely shields against unfriendly weather. Goodbye to brick walls—this is the era of glass and steel, of column-less corners, of transparency and the absence of weight.

For four and a half decades, Gropius has been occupied with one problem: how to bridge the gulf between artistic form and industrial production, how to use the machine for the creation of buildings both eminently practical and aesthetically satisfactory rather than choosing between wrecking it, or permitting it to dominate our lives: "We have no other choice but to accept the challenge of the machine in all fields of production until men finally adapt it fully to serve their needs."

Mr. Giedion tells us through words, and, even more eloquently, through a larger number of fine illustrations, how Gropius gradually reached his goal of producing the architecture befitting our age. From 1919 to 1928 he was director of the famous Bauhaus school (it was closed down by the Nazis in 1933 as "an incubator of cultural Bolshevism"). The years 1934-37 he worked in London, and for the last seventeen years he has been the great old man of Harvard University's School of Design. He had coined the Bauhaus slogan, "Together we Desire, we Design and we Create the New Building in which Architecture, Painting and Sculpture are One Complete Unity." He trained scores of young architects who were to carry his ideas over the world, and he designed the Weimar Republic's most progressive *Siedlung* schemes—multi-story apartment blocks with schools and shopping centers and parks to replace the overcrowded, lightless slums. Of the many structures he designed in the USA, perhaps the most striking is the Harvard Graduate Center: light and bright, so different from the red brick masonry of an earlier age.

Giedion mentions Gropius' peers among living architects, Le Corbusier and Wright, only once or twice, but no reader will fail to think of Wright throughout the book, Wright who seems to be the very antipode of Gropius. Where the American is romantic, the German is rationalistic; Wright is largely concerned with building beautiful homes for individuals in non-urban settings—Gropius' main concern is industrialization, standardization, prefabrication, in brief, the well-being of the masses in the large cities. Wright is a prima-donna; Gropius prefers teamwork with colleagues and experts in other fields. His aim is not handsome houses but a new way of life, yet his extremely rational buildings, perfectly designed and rhythmically planned, nevertheless achieve a great deal of nobility.

As a town planner, Gropius wants to build well-integrated, creative communities. To what extent he has succeeded in creating, in architectural terms, what seems to be his highest aim—an equilibrium between individual freedom and collective responsibility—will be assessed by the future. But there can be no doubt that he has given a great deal to his students both in Germany, and now in America, intent on producing in them a creative attitude and independence of conception to enable them to arrive at basic convictions.

Gropius himself is the author of an essay, "In Search of Better Architectural Education," one of several statements preceding the large picture section in *A Decade of Contemporary Architecture.* He is vice-president of CIAM which stands for "Les Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne," a professional organization founded in Switzerland in 1928. CIAM groups furnished the material from which a selection was made by Mr. Giedion, who is secretary general of CIAM.

The title has become obsolete, for in this edition of the book, the second, nearly two decades are covered—1935 to 1954. The textual part is much too fragmentary to provide enjoyable reading, but the pictorial section is excellent. Nearly every aspect of architecture is covered: single family homes, apartment houses, hotels, industrial and public buildings, retail centers, churches, theaters, recreation camps, exhibition halls, schools, hospitals, transport buildings, museums and airports. Gone is the pointless sentimentality, the sterile eclecticism of an earlier generation. Gone, too, is the notion that the initiative in cultural matters is necessarily a prerogative of the leading world powers—some of the finest buildings have sprung up in recent years in such peripheral regions as Finland and Brazil. ALFRED WERNER

Notes on the Critics

PAOLO MILANO is a critic of European literature. MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM is the author of a new book, *American Security and Freedom.* ALFRED WERNER has written several monographs on contemporary art.

HIS OWN

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THEATRE

The Living Room will have closed before this column appears, but I think an autopsy is justified partly because the play was truly alive and partly because the circumstances of its death were dubious, if not incriminating.

The play is about a young Catholic girl who has fallen in love with a married man. If the story were told by an old-fashioned Broadway liberal, the couple could elope, and, after a few verbal thrusts at stuffy illiberal views of sex, live happily ever after. But the plays nowadays are not about emancipation and escape; they are about the re-

The Living Room by Graham Greene.

turn to the cage or the failure ever to get out of the cage—a vain beating of wings against the bars for two Acts and three quarters and, at the end of Act Three, a dead canary lying on its side. Mr. Greene's tale of adultery is the standard story of present-day theatre: that of the highly-strung girl hounded to death. His protagonist, Rose Pemberton, kills herself.

What leads to the suicide scene is a scene between Rose and the wife. The latter (finely played by Carol Goodner) pretends she wants to kill herself and scatters sleeping pills on the carpet before rushing wildly out into the night. What distresses Rose is the discovery that the husband is still solicitious for his wife's welfare. He says: "I wish I knew where she'd gone. She hasn't many friends." So, in her pain and isolation, Rose swallows the pills. She is no heroine. As she dies, she mutters a schoolgirl prayer that school never start again.

Such are the fruits of adultery in the view of a Catholic author. But this author is a liberal Catholic; he wishes to criticize his own side. So, as family background, Rose is presented with three bad Catholics: two hags whose fear of death reaches psychotic proportions and a priest who is no more capable of real prayer than was Hamlet's Uncle Claudius. The moral is drawn: if any of these three had loved Rose sufficiently, she would not have committed suicide.

All of this is so meaningful and interesting a variant on the standard story that it exposes the standard treatment of it (say, *The Deep Blue Sea*) as the threadbare nonsense that it is. For the first half hour, you bask in the pleasure of hearing words that have been put together by a real writer to define the lives of people with moral, and not just psychological, problems. (The proper stuff of the drama is not neurosis but immorality.) How good it is to see religion shown on stage as, for better or worse, a substantial part of people's lives! How pleasant to encounter a religious playwright who is not naïve or inhibited about sexual passion!

If, at the end of the evening, we are disappointed, it is because unusually high hopes have been raised. The confrontation of sensuality and religion is a great dramatic archetype, and as our minds turn to great examples, we realize that we are being unfair to Mr. Greene. *The Living Room* not only fails to be great like *The Dybbuk*, it does not quite match certain plays by similar authors with a similar degree of talent: for example, François Mauriac's *Asmodée*, which is another Catholic account of non-Catholic intrusion into a Catholic home. Mauriac's play is complete: such are his people, this is their plight, this is what would happen. But, with Mr. Greene, the minute you begin to discuss his characters, you become acutely conscious that you don't know them. "Would Rose actually have killed herself?" That depends on what Rose is like. "Would she actually have had so little feeling for the wife's position?" That too depends . . . Mr. Greene leaves his characters unfinished, and the girl's suicide is not her failure but his. For when a playwright can't imagine what anyone says or what comes next, he substitutes sobbing for dialogue and, for action, death. Mr. Greene can also help out with a little macabre melodrama, however incongruous; he never quite manages to make his old hags seem part of the same play. And even in intellectual debate—which, for a brilliant author like this one, is easier to write—Mr. Greene is surprisingly gauche. He perpetrates what is, in this field, the Number One error: to give the author's spokesman all the good lines. (Bernard Shaw knew better when he gave the knock-down arguments, not to Joan, but to the Inquisitor.) For the priest who turns out to be a flawed human being has through most of the play been the voice of Catholic wisdom, while his antagonist, the husband, spouts what Mr. Greene evidently believes to be "modern ideas." When the priest says: "I thought Freud said there was no such thing as guilt," there is no one on stage to retort: "Then you thought wrong."

I do not suggest that it is his duty to do such battle. If the situation in this play were clearer, one might be able to say that ideology has nothing whatever to do with it. Possibly Mr. Greene's strongest point against adultery is a strictly common-sense one that any old pagan can accept: that adultery doesn't seem to make people any happier but on the contrary. Yet at this point I am assailed with doubts. Possibly Mr. Greene doesn't want us to be happy—but to sin our way to Jesus? Possibly he has stacked the cards: we should have to ask him to show us sexual passion which is *not* adulterous. Are there even married people who love each other carnally? I have many questions to ask Mr. Greene.

Meanwhile, he has my condolences. His play, well received in London and Paris, has been shockingly treated in New York not only by the critics but also by its producers. The Gilbert Miller management went to the trouble of importing from England a director, Hugh Hunt, whose work, so far as I know, has never been better than "deestahngay"—much like that of the Miller management. Perhaps someone told Mr. Hunt the play was too quiet for Broadway, for he ruined Mr. Greene's quiet intensity (the best thing about the play, perhaps) by having the actors shout, sob, bite their lips, grit their teeth, clench their fists, and generally convey the idea of Oh God What Shall I Do?—a question only asked when it is too late to do anything.

And then there was the miscasting, notably of the main role. I liked Barbara Bel Geddes and the sincerity with which she was working on herself; Rose seemed in love, and love was given a quiet, un-Broadwayish reality. But I do not think Miss Bel Geddes seemed spiritual, seemed connected by any bond to the Catholic culture which is Mr Greene's subject matter. Nor is her technique adequate. What place is there in this living (no, dying) room for an affected little drawl out of *The Moon is Blue?*

ERIC BENTLEY

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CORRESPONDENCE

► The Christian Interpretation of History

SIRS:

Lewis Mumford's fine review of Toynbee's work (*NR*, November 8) is marred by a persistent misunderstanding of the Christian interpretation of history, and in particular of Reinhold Niebuhr's contemporary restatement of it. It is simple misrepresentation to say that Toynbee is "very close to Reinhold Niebuhr's position" because he is "driven to seek an Other Worldly exit." The final sections of Niebuhr's first essay in *Beyond Tragedy* ought to be sufficient to set Mumford—and for that matter Toynbee—to reading Niebuhr with more attention. A couple of sentences may make the point:

> The fulfilment (of history) is neither a negation of its essential character nor yet a further development of its own inherent capacities. It is rather a completion of its essence by an annihilation of the contradictions which sin has introduced into human life.

ALEXANDER MILLER
Stanford University

► The Directions of Liberalism

SIRS:

Mr. Straight seems to have appointed himself spokesman for American liberals in his comments of November 22 on Mr. Crossman's report of his visit to the United States. May I, as one of those cases of arrested development—the unreconstructed "veteran of the thirties"—make it clear that Mr. Straight does not speak for me?

1. Let me first assure Mr. Straight that, as a member of "a generation . . . drawn by depression and war into association with the Communists," I am emphatically *not* "tormented by confusions of the past." An ardent supporter of the Popular Front, I was not then nor am I now confused about the decision I made. I was ready to join with the Communists or anyone else — even Tories like Churchill—to resist the Hitlers, Francos and Mussolinis of this world. Even after fifteen years of watching the Communists exploit and betray liberal movements, I would do exactly the same again. I would join with the Communists today in resisting a Hitler in this country.

2. As if to lend a touch of respectability to ours, Mr. Straight reminds us that the British have a "loyalty" program of their own. "It does not undermine British liberty," he says, "and it is toward the British system that ours will evolve." This evolution is, to say the least, extremely unlikely. . . .

What does Mr. Straight himself suggest? Resign ourselves to the garrison mentality, wait out the cycle of reaction, nursing a dear little New Deal-Fair Deal program which we hope will grow up to be acceptable to Mr. Straight's new idol, "the majority of Americans," some twenty years hence? Not nearly good enough. What we need is a vigorous campaign right now to extend the frontiers of social democracy in every field against the entrenched power of money, big business and the corporate interests. Abuses on every hand cry out for reform: the shameful corruption of youthful minds and emotions by the mass entertainment media; the exorbitant costs of an utterly inadequate, and sometimes criminally indifferent, medical service; the undermining of the conservation program and theft of the people's natural resources by private interests greedy for profit; the exploitation of teachers and the sacrifice of the future interests of the young, as we continue to try to get our education—and indeed all things of the mind (or the minimum of them considered indispensible) — cheaply. There's lots to put right if we have the heart for it. A little of the spirit of the thirties would do us no harm.

J. F. GOLAY
Buckroe Beach, Virginia

The New Republic *welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.*

BANDWAGON

AN Iowa Senator—Democrat Arnold Utzig—reported he spent $200 "in taverns" during his successful campaign for re-election November 2nd. "I've always done that," Utzig said in referring to what he called his campaign of "Personal Contact" in the taverns, adding: "That's our method here."—*Associated Press Radio Wire*, Nov. 13, 1954.

SEE *The C. E. Wilson Story* . . . a tribute to a hard worker whose ambitions took him to the presidency of General Motors and to the nation's high office as Secretary of Defense. Another success story through Free Enterprise in the Comic Section.—(Advertisement) *Detroit Free Press*, November 26, 1954.

SENATOR William E. Langer, Republican of North Dakota, who once faced a move that failed to prevent him from taking his seat in the Senate and has been indicating support of Mr. McCarthy, rose to say the speech by Mr. Dirksen "brought tears to my eyes."

Senator Langer asked if the resolution might not include a provision to send flowers to Senator McCarthy and "whether we should not debate the kind of flowers which should be sent, would they be forget-me-nots, chrysanthemums or roses."

Mr. Langer said this would be "a very fine gesture," but Senator Dirksen said the sending of flowers should be a personal matter.—*The New York Times*, November 19, 1954.

PRESIDENT Eisenhower's aides have found a way to get the President to read what they want him to read. They manage to have the material placed on his night table, where he finds it when he retires to read in bed. The plan is known to work because President Eisenhower later has discussed the material left with him.—*US News & World Report*, November 26, 1954.

IF actual hostilities should break out, which God forbid, we Americans would be in a position to fight a humanly decent war. . . . —*New Republic*, Oct. 11, 1954.

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